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The aim of the study was to investigate how high math-anxious (HMA) individuals react 
to errors in an arithmetic task. Twenty HMA and 19 low math-anxious (LMA) individuals 
were presented with a multi-digit addition verification task and were given response 
feedback. Post-error adjustment measures (response time and accuracy) were analyzed in 
order to study differences between groups when faced with errors in an arithmetical task. 
Results showed that both HMA and LMA individuals were slower to respond following an 
error than following a correct answer. However, post-error accuracy effects emerged only 
for the HMA group, showing that they were also less accurate after having committed an 
error than after giving the right answer. Importantly, these differences were observed only 
when individuals needed to repeat the same response given in the previous trial. These 
results suggest that, for HMA individuals, errors caused reactive inhibition of the erroneous 
response, facilitating performance if the next problem required the alternative response but 
hampering it if the response was the same. This stronger reaction to errors could be a factor 
contributing to the difficulties that HMA individuals experience in learning math and doing 
math tasks. 
 




Math anxiety is defined as an adverse emotional reaction to math or to the prospect of 
doing math (Hembree, 1990), and it is a topic of increasing interest because of its negative 
consequences for math achievement (for a recent review, see Suárez-Pellicioni, Núñez-
Peña, & Colomé, 2016). High math-anxious individuals (hereinafter, HMA) perform more 
poorly on a range of numerical and mathematical tasks and obtain lower grades in math 
courses they take (Ashcraft & Krause, 2007), as compared with their low math-anxious 
peers (hereinafter, LMA). As a consequence, they avoid this subject in their academic 
curriculum (Hembree, 1990), limiting their opportunities at the professional level, which 
may result in a lower socioeconomic status. Moreover, math anxiety not only has an impact 
in formal settings (math classroom or math tests), but also in more everyday settings (e.g., 
checking a tip on a restaurant bill when other are watching; Ashcraft & Moore, 2009).  
It should be noted that math anxiety has a high prevalence in the population. Evidence of 
this can be found in the latest PISA report (2012, Programme for International Student 
Assessment), in which 15-year-old students from member countries of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reported agreeing or strongly agreeing 
with the following statements: I get very tense when I have to do mathematics homework 
(33%), I get very nervous doing mathematics problems (31%), and I feel helpless when 
doing a mathematics problem (30%). Furthermore, in the United States, 25% of four-year 
college students and up to 80% of community college students suffer from math anxiety 
from a moderate to high degree (Beilock & Willingham, 2014). It is therefore important to 
study whether math anxious individuals do anything different when processing a 
mathematical problem, as compared with their low math anxious peers, as this can help to 
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broaden our understanding of the factors contributing to the relationship between high math 
anxiety and low math achievement. 
An important issue people face when solving a mathematical problem is how they react 
to errors. An error can affect the answer to subsequent problems in different ways. 
Intuitively, one might think that an error can help to improve performance because we learn 
from mistakes, hence the expression “mistakes are often the best teacher”. The idea here is 
that an error might help us realize why we committed it and to pay more attention to the 
following problem/task. Unfortunately, an error can also block us from effectively solving 
the following problem, undermining the positive contribution that the mistake can make to 
learning. This is usually the case when errors are particularly relevant.  
Error adaptation has been widely studied (Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011; Dulilh, 
Vandekerckhove, Forstmann, Keuleers, Brysbaert, & Wagenmakers, 2012) and different 
accounts have been proposed to explain reactions to errors. The conflict monitoring account 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) claims that after an error or conflict the 
response threshold will increase. Thus, when an error is detected a compensatory control 
mechanism is activated in order to improve subsequent performance (i.e., we become more 
cautious after an error). Therefore, an increase in response time (known as post-error 
slowing – hereafter referred to as PES) and in hit rate (known as post-error improvement in 
accuracy) would be predicted following an error. This prediction has been confirmed in 
some studies (Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011; Maier, 
Yeung, & Steinhauser, 2011; Marco-Pallarés, Camara, Münte, & Rodríguez-Fornells, 
2008) and, as a result, PES has been considered a measure of cognitive control. According 
to this account, post-error adjustments would reflect an adaptive mechanism that would 
prevent the occurrence of further errors, supporting the learning function of errors. 
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An alternative view is offered by the orienting account (Notebaert et al., 2009), which 
claims that an error is an infrequent event that causes an orienting response, with post-error 
adjustment being considered as an attentional effect. Because of their infrequency, errors 
are unexpected, motivationally salient events which capture participants’ attention and 
distract them during the processing of the subsequent stimulus. Thus, the orienting account 
predicts that previous errors will worsen performance, producing increased PES and a 
decrease in hit rate. Some studies have confirmed these predictions (Fiehler, Ullsperger, & 
Von Cramon, 2005; Rabbit & Rodgers, 1977). Hence, it has been suggested that post-error 
adjustments may result from a failure to disengage attention from the error (Carp & 
Compton, 2009) or from a failure to disengage from performance difficulties including 
increased response conflict (Compton, Arnstein, Freedman, Dainer-Best, & Liss, 2011). In 
this context, it is also worth noting a recent study by Van der Borght, Braem, and Notebaert 
(2016), who reported differences in post-error adaptations depending on trait anxiety and 
time. Using a Simon task they reproduced previous results showing that PES increased and 
post-error accuracy decreased with short inter-trial intervals (ITI), and that these effects 
were reduced or even reversed (for post-error accuracy) with increasing ITIs (Danielmeier 
& Ullsperger, 2011; Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009). As suggested by Van der Borght et al. 
(2016) these results are consistent with the idea that people have difficulties disengaging 
attention from the error shortly after error commission. Interestingly, the ITI effect on post-
error adaptations depended on trait anxiety level. Only low-anxious individuals improved 
their performance when the ITI was long, suggesting that high-anxious individuals have 
difficulties disengaging from an error, even when time allows for it.  
Finally, the inhibitory account (Ridderinkhof, 2002) suggests that the commission of an 
error activates an inhibitory mechanism that increases the strength of motor suppression or 
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inhibition of responses on a subsequent trial. In this view, PES is linked to motor stopping 
or suppression of an action (i.e., behavioral response) that is considered inappropriate in a 
given context. The predictions made by this account for post-error behavioral effects are the 
same as those of the orienting account, namely that errors will worsen performance in the 
following trial, producing increased PES and a post-error decrease in accuracy. Marco-
Pallarés et al. (2008) reported psychophysiological evidence supporting the inhibitory 
account. In their event-related fMRI experiment they found a coincidence between brain 
regions related to inhibition in a stop-signal task (consisting in presenting a red square in 
25% of the trials, signaling to participants that they should inhibit their response) and the 
activation observed on correct trials occurring after error commission in a flanker task. 
They also found that PES correlated with an increase in beta band power, which has been 
associated with inhibitory processes and, specifically, with motor inhibition. These results 
suggest that PES is probably due to an increase in the amount of response inhibition after 
an error. 
Although error adaptation has been widely studied, nothing is known about how HMA 
individuals behaviorally adapt after errors committed in a mathematical problem. This is an 
important question and exploring it could help in understanding the extent to which math 
anxiety reduces or interferes with learning from errors. In this context, Suárez-Pellicioni, 
Núñez-Peña, and Colomé (2013), using event-related brain potentials (ERP), found that 
math anxiety is related to an abnormal error monitoring processing. These authors formed 
two groups according to participants’ level of math anxiety and asked them to perform a 
numerical Stroop task (participants were presented with a pair of numbers of different size 
and had to report the number of larger numerical magnitude while ignoring its physical 
size) and a classical word-color Stroop task. An increase in error-related brain activity (i.e., 
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the error-related negativity potential - ERN) was found in the HMA group, as compared 
with their LMA counterparts, when they solved the numerical Stroop task, but not when 
they solved the classical one. Given that a source localization analysis of this component 
identified the right insula as being at the basis of this ERN enhancement for the HMA 
group in the numerical (vs. the non-numerical) task, the authors interpreted the result 
according to the motivational significance theory of the ERN (Hajcak & Foti, 2008; 
Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005) and suggested that HMA individuals might be 
characterized by a greater sensitivity to — and concern over — errors in numerical tasks. 
Suárez-Pellicioni et al. (2013) found differences between HMA and LMA participants after 
errors only in the ERN signature, and not at the level of post-error adjustments in 
performance (RT and accuracy). However, they used a numerical Stroop task and nothing 
is yet known about how HMA individuals react to errors in a more genuine mathematical 
task, like solving an arithmetic problem.  
In the present study we examined post-error adjustments in high and low math-anxious 
individuals when they performed a multi-digit addition verification task. Two groups were 
formed according to their scores on the Shortened Mathematics Anxiety Rating Scale 
(Alexander  & Martray, 1989) and on the trait subscale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), such that groups were extreme on 
the former but did not differ on the latter; thus, we could rule out the possibility that group 
differences could be explained by trait anxiety. In comparison with previous studies on 
error monitoring from our lab (Suárez-Pellicioni et al., 2013) the present study introduces 
two important new aspects: First, as mentioned above, we administered an arithmetic task 
which we believe is more informative regarding the difficulties HMA individuals face 
when they have to deal with math class requirements (as compared with a numerical Stroop 
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task, which is an attentional task). Second, participants were given external error feedback, 
because we expected that becoming aware of their mistakes would be more emotionally 
arousing for the HMA group. In fact, error feedback can act in HMA individuals as a 
reinforcement of their own perceived low math self-efficacy, that is, of their belief in their 
low potential to do math successfully (Meece, Wigfield, & Eccles, 1990). 
Given that previous studies have consistently shown that HMA individuals are 
characterized by an attentional control deficit when they have to process math information 
(e.g., Suárez-Pellicioni, Núñez-Peña, & Colomé, 2015), which would make them more 
vulnerable to distraction, and considering previous evidence from our lab showing that 
HMA individuals present an abnormal error response to numerical errors (Suárez-Pellicioni 
et al., 2013), we expected that an error in an arithmetic verification task, being an adverse 
stimulus for the HMA group, would draw their attention away from the task and would 
undermine their performance in the following trial. Hence, we predicted that task 
performance after errors would be more impaired for HMA individuals, resulting in 
increased PES and a post-error decrease in accuracy. 
Returning to the post-error adjustment accounts described above, both the orienting and 
inhibitory accounts predict performance impairment (response time and hit rate) in a trial 
following an error. On the one hand, the orienting account of post-error adjustment 
(Notebaert et al., 2009) states that errors are events that capture individuals’ attention, 
slowing response time and decreasing accuracy in the following trial. According to this 
account, the impairment in performance after an error will be general (i.e., an error would 
worsen any kind of response in the following trial). On the other hand, the inhibitory 
account of post-error adjustment (Ridderinkhof, 2002) states that performance after an error 
worsens because the error causes behavioral inhibition or motor suppression. According to 
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this account, two possible patterns of results could be expected. In one, the behavioral 
inhibition of motor response may be general, affecting any kind of response following an 
error; in other words, both possible responses in our verification task would be inhibited. In 
this case, predictions would be the same as those based on the orienting account, that is, 
general post-error impairment. In the other possible pattern of results, behavioral inhibition 
may be more reactive and specific to the motor response given previously; in other words, 
PES and a decrease in post-error accuracy would be expected only for responses to 
problems requiring an identical response to the previous one, the one which resulted in an 
error (e.g., having to say in the current trial that the proposed solution for the addition is 
correct, when in the previous trial the participant committed an error by reporting a given 
proposed solution as correct). In the present study we wanted to shed light on this issue by 
examining whether a previous error in an arithmetic task would impair the performance of 
HMA individuals in the following trial in general (i.e., error followed by any kind of 
response) or if such an error would impair performance only when the same response as 
that previously given needs to be repeated in the current trial (i.e., having to give the same 




Thirty-nine healthy volunteers were tested in this study, all of them selected from a sample 
of 629 students from the University of Barcelona who were assessed for math anxiety and 
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trait anxiety (see Materials)1. Means and standard errors of the mean (SEM) on the 
Shortened Mathematics Anxiety Rating Scale (sMARS) (Alexander & Martray, 1989) for 
the larger sample were 64.97 and 0.67 respectively. The first quartile on the sMARS scores 
was 53 and the third quartile was 77. 
The LMA group comprised 19 participants who scored below the first quartile on the 
sMARS, whereas the HMA group included 20 participants scoring above the third quartile 
on that test. In order to control for trait anxiety, participants in both groups were matched 
according to their scores on the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), i.e. participants in both groups were paired according to 
their STAI scores, so that groups differed in math anxiety but not in trait anxiety. Math 
anxiety and trait anxiety are correlated (Hembree, 1990), so by controlling the latter we 
could rule out the possibility that group differences could be explained by trait anxiety. One 
LMA participant who was initially selected was excluded from the final sample due to 
technical problems during data acquisition. For more detailed information about the two 
groups, see Table 1.  
Groups differed in math anxiety (t(37) = 19.52, p < .001) but not in trait anxiety 
(t(37) = 1.15, p = .25), age (t(37) = .30, p = .76), years of formal education (t(37) = .94, 
p = .35), or handedness (χ² = .30, p = 1).  
All had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity and did not report any history of 
neurological or psychiatric disorders. Participants were naive as to the purposes of the 
study.  
Insert Table 1 approximately here 
                                                 
1 The present work and Núñez-Peña & Suárez-Pellicioni (2015) are subsets of the same larger dataset. In Núñez-Peña & 
Suárez-Pellicioni the time course of neural processing was investigated without taking into account previous response 




Shortened Mathematics Anxiety Rating Scale (sMARS) (Alexander & Martray, 1989). 
The sMARS is a 25-item version of the Math Anxiety Rating Scale (MARS) (Richardson 
& Suinn, 1972). This instrument measures anxiety by presenting 25 situations which may 
cause math anxiety (e.g., Thinking about the math exam I will have next week). The 
respondent indicates the level of anxiety associated with the item using a five-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (no anxiety) to 5 (high anxiety). The sum of the item scores provides 
the total score for the instrument, which ranges from 25 to 125. In the present study we 
used the Spanish version of the sMARS (Núñez-Peña, Suárez-Pellicioni, Guilera, & 
Mercadé-Carranza, 2013). The scores for the Spanish version of the sMARS have shown 
strong internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .94) and high 7-week test-retest reliability 
(intra-class correlation coefficient = .72). 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger et al., 1983). The STAI is a 40-item 
scale used to measure state (STAI-S) and trait (STAI-T) anxiety, 20 items each. Only the 
STAI-T subscale, which measures a more general and relatively stable tendency to respond 
with anxiety, was used in this study. This subscale comprises 20 statements describing 
different emotions, and for each item respondents use a four-point Likert scale (ranging 
from 0: almost never, to 3: almost always) to indicate how they feel “in general”. Good to 
excellent internal consistency (Cronbach´s alpha = .95), adequate 30-day test-retest 
reliability with high-school students (r = .75), and 20-day test-retest reliability with college 
students (r = .86) has been reported for the Spanish version of this subscale (Spielberger, 
Gorsuch, & Lushene, 2008).  
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A two-digit addition task was presented to each participant. Addends ranged between 12 
and 29 and were presented horizontally on the screen (e.g., 14 + 17). Each pair of addends 
was followed by the proposed solution, which could be correct (e.g., 31) or incorrect (+10 
from the correct solution; e.g., 41). From all possible combinations of addends in the 
abovementioned range, those which could generate confusion with other processes (e.g., 
rule application) were excluded; thus, numbers 10, 11, 20, and 21, tie problems (e.g., 
12+12), and consecutive addends (e.g., 12+13) were not included. From all the remaining 
possible combinations, two hundred additions were randomly selected. All participants 
were administered with the same set of problems. Numbers were presented in font size 50 
(Courier New) in white against a black background and subtended at visual angles of 6.30° 
(addition) and 2.29° (proposed solution) horizontally and 1.48° vertically.  
 
2.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. Upon entering the experimental room, participants 
completed standard procedures concerning informed consent, along with a demographics 
questionnaire asking their age and number of years of formal education. They were then 
seated 100 cm away from the computer screen and detailed task instructions were given. 
The session began with a training period of 25 trials, for which participants received 
feedback on their performance. The training trials were only used to familiarize participants 
with the task, and they were excluded from the statistical analysis. After completing the 
training trials, participants began the experimental session, which consisted of four blocks 
of 50 stimuli (200 total trials) separated by a 1-minute rest. Trials were randomly presented 
to each participant.  
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The task for participants consisted in indicating whether the proposed solution for the 
presented addition was true or false by pressing the left or right button of the mouse. 
Response buttons were counterbalanced within each group. Participants were encouraged to 
answer as fast and as accurately as possible. Each trial began with a fixation sign (an 
asterisk) shown for 500 ms, which was followed by the addition, presented for 1500 ms 
with a pre- and post- 100 ms inter-stimulus interval (ISI). The proposed solution then 
appeared and remained on screen until the participant gave a response (or for a maximum 
of 2000 ms), after which a 500 ms pause was presented. Then, feedback lasting 1000 ms 
was given, indicating correct response, incorrect response or no response. Finally, the trial 
ended with a variable inter-trial interval ranging from 600 to 900 ms, with 100 ms 
increments (all pauses consisted of a black screen).  
The E-prime 2.0 program (Psychology Software Tools Inc., Sharpsburg, PA, USA) was 
used to control the presentation and timing of the stimuli and the measurement of response 
accuracy and response times. 
 
3. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Data from one participant in the HMA group were discarded due to the high percentage of 
errors (close to chance level; 50%), suggesting that this participant might have been 
answering randomly to the task. The reported effects did not change after excluding the 
data from this participant. Response time (RT) outliers of the remaining 38 participants (19 
in each group) were also removed. Outliers were identified on a normal model distribution-
basis, taking into account the within-subject variables Previous accuracy (error and correct 
answer) and the between-subjects variable Math anxiety group (LMA and HMA). Of all 
trials, 1% had an estimated residual below/above the 5% confidence limit and they were 
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removed from the RT analyses. This analysis was carried out using the extremevalues 
package in R (van der Loo, 2010). 
In order to study post-error effects in relation to the type of response transition from 
previous to current trial (repetition or alternation), responses were coded as repetitions 
when the response given by the participant in the current trial coincided with the one 
previously given and as alternations when they differed (note that this coding was always 
in relation to the response given by the participant, regardless of its accuracy and, 
accordingly, it was generated before the removal of errors and outliers; see above). The first 
trial of each block was also excluded from these analyses (because there was no previous 
response for these trials). Means of RTs for the remaining correctly solved trials and the 
percentage of hits were submitted to separate ANOVAs with the within-subject factors 
Previous accuracy (correct, error) and Type of response transition (repetition, alternation), 
and the between-subjects factor MA group (HMA, LMA).  
RT analysis showed significant effects of Previous accuracy (F(1,36) = 4.26, p = .046; 
responses were slower after erroneous responses than after correct answers; means were 
779 ms and 749 ms for post-error and post-correct, respectively) and MA group 
(F(1,36) = 6.59, p = .014; HMA participants showed slower responses than their LMA 
peers; means were 844 ms and 684 ms, respectively).  The main effect of Type of response 
transition was not significant (F(1,36) = 1.88, p = .18). Nevertheless, the Previous 
accuracy x Type of response transition interaction was significant (F(1,36) = 7.87, p = 
.008). Separated analyses for each type of response transition showed that responses after 
errors were significantly slower than after correct answers (significant PES) for response 
repetitions (effect of Previous accuracy for repetitions: F(1,36) = 10.25, p = .003) but not 
for response alternations (effect of Previous accuracy for alternations: F<1). In addition, 
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after errors, response repetitions were slower than response alternations (effect of Type of 
response transition after errors: F(1,36) = 5.57, p = .025), whereas this difference was not 
significant after correct answers (effect of Type of response transition after correct 
answers: F(1,36) = 2.40, p = .13). None of the remaining interactions (Previous accuracy x 
MA group; Type of response transition x MA group; Previous accuracy x Type of response 
transition x MA group) was significant (Fs<1). Means of RTs and standard errors of the 
mean (SEM) according to Previous accuracy and Types of response transition for the HMA 
and LMA groups are given in Table 2.  
 
Insert Table 2 approximately here 
 
The ANOVA for percentage of hits showed significant main effects of Previous 
accuracy (F(1,36) = 6.43; p = .016; responses were less accurate after errors than after 
correct responses; 84% and 87%, respectively) and MA group (F(1,36) = 6.52, p = .015; 
HMA participants were less accurate than their LMA peers; 83% and 89%, respectively). 
The main effect of Type of response transition was not significant (F<1), neither any of the 
two-way interactions (Type of response transition x Previous accuracy: F(1,36) = 1.18, 
p = .28; Type of response transition x MA group: F(1,36) = 2.20, p = .15; Previous 
accuracy x MA group: F<1). Importantly, the three-way interaction Previous accuracy x 
Type of response transition x MA group was significant (F(1,36) = 5.09, p = .03). In order 
to study this interaction in more detail, separate ANOVAs were performed for each group. 
For the HMA group, the ANOVA showed a significant Previous accuracy x Type of 
response transition interaction (F(1,18) = 5.68, p = .03). More specifically, for these 
individuals the post-error reduction in accuracy was significant when a response repetition 
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was required (effect of Previous accuracy for response repetitions: F(1,18) = 8.08, p = .01) 
but not in the case of response alternation (effect of Previous accuracy for response 
alternations: F<1). For the LMA group, neither the effect of Previous accuracy 
(F(1,18) = 2.75, p = .12), nor the Previous accuracy x Type of response transition 
interaction were significant (F<1). Means and SEMs of percentage of hits according to 
Previous accuracy and Types of response transition for the HMA and the LMA group are 
given in Table 3.  
 
Insert Table 3 approximately here 
 
 4. DISCUSSION 
The aim of the present study was to investigate how HMA individuals react to errors in 
an arithmetic task. To this end, we selected two groups of participants with extreme scores 
on math anxiety (low and high math anxious groups) but no differences in trait anxiety. 
Individuals were presented with a multi-digit addition verification task and their responses 
to trials following correctly and incorrectly answered problems were compared. In this way, 
we sought to broaden our understanding of the impact mistakes might have on HMA 
individuals’ subsequent performance on an arithmetic task. This is an important question 
because errors are often considered a critical part of the learning process. Although errors 
can be the “best teacher” and may play a positive role in the learning process, they are also 
associated with negative feelings, which might interfere with math learning and math 
performance in general. 
The present study confirms previous findings showing that accuracy decreases and 
response time is slower after having committed an error (Fiehler, Ullsperger, & Von 
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Cramon, 2005; Rabbit & Rodgers, 1977), and that HMA individuals are slower and more 
error-prone than their LMA counterparts in solving arithmetic problems (Hembree, 1990). 
Importantly, the present study adds further evidence to our understanding of post-error 
behavioral adjustments (response time and hit rate), since our results suggest that these 
adjustments depend on the type of response transition and math anxiety. Specifically, as for 
response time, we found that both HMA and LMA individuals were slower in verifying 
problems after having committed an error than after having given a correct answer but only 
when they needed to give the same response as the one given in the previous trial (i.e., PES 
were significant only for response repetitions). Regarding accuracy, post-error adjustment 
depended not only on the type of response transition but also on math anxiety: post-error 
reduction in accuracy was only found for the HMA group when they needed to repeat the 
previously given response. By contrast, no difference in hit rate was found in the LMA 
group when their responses after errors were compared with their responses after correct 
answers. 
Our findings may have important implications for existing accounts of behavioral post-
error adjustment. Since PES was found only when the current trial required the same 
response as that previously given, it seems that error commission is followed by direct 
response suppression (i.e., inhibition response). This result lends support to the inhibitory 
account of post-error adjustment (Ridderinkhof, 2002). It should be noted that according to 
the orienting account (Notebaert et al., 2009) we would not have expected differences in 
post-error behavior depending on the response transition (repetition versus alternation 
between responses from the previous to the current trial), because the orienting response 
would have affected any response following an error. In this way, our results add further 
evidence to previous brain imaging studies suggesting that PES reflects a mechanism of 
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response inhibition (Marco-Pallarés et al., 2008) and to behavioral studies suggesting that 
PES reflects activity of the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) (Kleiter & 
Schwarzenbacher, 1987) and is positively related to BIS scores (Boksem, Tops, 
Kostermans, & De Cremer, 2008). The BIS is a motivational system proposed by Gray 
(1989) that is sensitive to signals of punishment and inhibits behaviors that may have 
aversive consequences. 
Importantly, the present results showed that post-error behavior in an arithmetic task 
differed according to math anxiety. LMA individuals showed PES when they had to repeat 
their previous response, but no post-error decrease in accuracy: there was no difference 
between their accuracy after errors and after correct answers. So, LMA individuals’ 
responses after an error were slower but accurate. However, when their HMA peers 
committed an error, they were not only slower but also less accurate, specifically when the 
same response (true/false) was required by the following arithmetic verification problem. 
This post-error behavior shown by HMA individuals is compatible with the inhibitory 
account of post-error adjustment (Ridderinkhof, 2002) (i.e., they become slower and more 
error prone after error commission because they over-inhibit the response associated with 
that error). The response over-inhibition in the HMA group that our results suggest is 
consistent with previous studies reporting that higher levels of trait anxiety are related with 
enhanced response inhibition. In an ERP experiment, Sehlmeyer et al. (2010) used a 
Go/No-go task in which participants had to respond to the Go condition and withhold 
responses to the No-go condition. They found that the No-go N2 ERP component, assumed 
to reflect inhibition or revision of a motor plan prior to motor execution (Falkenstein, 
Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1999), was enhanced in high anxious individuals. They 
concluded that high trait-anxious people can be characterized by enhanced evaluation of 
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their behavioral outcomes, which may be reflected in increased inhibition-related No-go 
N2.  
The present results are also compatible with a stronger engagement of HMA individuals 
in counterfactual thoughts or in the simulation of the alternative response “ought to have 
done” after errors, as observed in other memory and reasoning tasks (Markman & Weary, 
1996). If this were the case, the mental simulation of the alternative response might 
increase its activation and, as a consequence, the chances of committing an error if the 
same instead of the alternative response were required (Tops & Boksem, 2011). Errors in 
math tasks might be particularly adverse for the HMA group, and in order to avoid erring 
again they would prepare the alternative response (e.g. the one which would have been 
correct in the previous erroneous trial). In contrast, after correct answers, counterfactual 
thoughts would not be generated, which would be consistent with the absence of significant 
response transition effect. 
Previous studies have already reported abnormal error monitoring in HMA individuals 
(Suárez-Pellicioni et al., 2013). In their study, Suárez-Pellicioni et al. (2013) concluded that 
HMA individuals may suffer from a greater sensitivity to — and concern over — errors 
committed in a numerical task, as compared with errors in a non-numerical task, and that 
this hypersensitivity to self-generated errors might play a role in the maintenance of math 
anxiety. The results of the current study add evidence of abnormal error adaptation in HMA 
individuals by showing how their errors in a more ecological math setting (i.e., a multi-digit 
addition task) have a clear impact on their subsequent behavior, slowing their response time 
and decreasing their accuracy.  
As for LMA individuals’ post-error behavior, the fact that in our study they showed a 
PES (in terms of RT) but no post-error accuracy effect is consistent with the finding that 
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these effects are reduced or even disappear with increasing ITIs (Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 
2011; Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009). Thus, our LMA participants would have had enough 
time to adapt to their errors, avoiding their negative impact on performance in the following 
trial. However, their HMA counterparts seemed to have had trouble adapting to an error 
even if enough time was given. This conclusion is further supported by the results of a 
recent study by Van der Borght, Braem, and Notebaert (2016), who found that only low 
trait-anxious individuals (but not their high-anxious peers) could counteract the detrimental 
effect of errors when time allowed for it.  
The evidence provided in the present study may have practical implications for 
understanding how HMA individuals learn mathematics and why they show low math 
achievement as compared with their LMA peers. Whereas committing errors in a math task 
did not decrease accuracy in the following trial in the LMA group, errors increased the 
probability of committing more errors in the HMA group when the same, previously 
erroneous response was required. The difficulties HMA individuals face when they have to 
solve additions after having committed an error suggests that their processing resources 
might be reduced due to the effort of inhibiting the response associated with that error (it 
seems that HMA individuals try to avoid making a subsequent error in the arithmetic task 
by means of an over-activation of the BIS to prevent them from repeating the response that 
made them commit an error) and/or due to the simulation of the alternative response.  
Although the results are quite specific, since the effect is shown only when the same, 
previously erroneous response is required, our findings suggest that HMA individuals show 
an abnormal adaptation to errors committed in a math task, an adaptation which, instead of 
translating into better performance, seems to affect it negatively. Thus, despite being 
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specific, any effect that can explain HMA individuals’ negative math performance should 
be considered of relevance and studied in more detail.  
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the current study demonstrated a different behavioral reaction in HMA 
and LMA individuals when dealing with errors in mathematics. Whereas response to an 
addition following an error was slower in both groups, the HMA group also showed a post-
error decrease in accuracy (i.e., after an error they were not only slower but also less 
accurate). Importantly, this impairment was shown only when the required response to the 
current addition was the same as the one previously associated with an error. Hence, this 
study supports behavioral over-inhibition of HMA individuals as a reaction to errors in an 
arithmetic task, which might occur together with a stronger tendency to simulate the 
alternative response. The abnormal response of HMA individuals to self-committed errors 
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Table 1. Means and standard error of the mean (SEM; in brackets) for age, math anxiety, 
trait anxiety, handedness, and years of formal education for the low math-anxious (LMA) 
and high math-anxious (HMA) groups. 
 LMA HMA 
Age 22.00 (3.35) 21.70 (2.83) 
Math anxiety 44.79 (7.39) 86.40 (5.86) 
Trait anxiety 16.79 (7.01) 20.15 (10.69) 
Handedness 18 18 
Years of formal education 9.64 (1.64) 9.90 (1.51) 
 
Note. Math anxiety measured with the sMARS (Alexander & Martray, 1986); Trait 
anxiety measured with the trait subscale of the STAI (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, 
Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983); Handedness: number of right-handed. Years of formal education: 
counting from 12 years old onwards.  
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Table 2. Mean RTs (in milliseconds; SEM in brackets) for correctly solved trials according 
to accuracy in the previous trial and to the type of response transition from previous to 
current trial in the HMA and LMA groups. Distribution of trials (in %) for the three-way 
design is also given. 
 
 High Math Anxious group Low Math Anxious group 






















Note. Repetition: when the response given by the participant in the current trial (always 
correct in the RT analyses) coincided with the one previously given (which could be correct 
or incorrect); Alternation: when the response given by the participant in the current trial 
differed from the one previously given. 
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Table 3: Percentages of hits (SEM in brackets) according to accuracy in the previous trial 
and to the type of response transition from previous to current trial in the HMA and LMA 
groups. Distribution of trials on average (in %) for the three-way design is also given. 
 
 High Math Anxious group Low Math Anxious group 






















Note. Repetition: when the response required by the current problem was the same as the 
one previously given by the participant; Alternation: when the response required by the 
current problem was not the one previously given by the participant. 
 
 
